Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Millview County Water District began diverting substantial flows from the Russian River under a century-old water rights claim leased from Hill and Gomes. In 2009, Millview purchased the claim for $2.1 million, four months after the State Water Resources Control Board proposed a cease and desist order (CDO) to drastically restrict diversion under the claim. After the Board entered the CDO, Millview, Hill, and Gomes jointly prevailed in a mandate action challenging the CDO. After the court of appeal affirmed, they sought an award of attorney fees from the Board under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, arguing they had conferred a substantial public benefit by obtaining a published appellate opinion addressing the issue of water rights forfeiture and that the action had constituted a “financial burden” to them because they stood to gain no money judgment. The trial court awarded plaintiffs attorney fees with respect to the appeal but declined to award fees incurred during the remainder of the legal proceedings. The court of appeal vacated the award and affirmed the trial court’s decision not to award additional fees, concluding plaintiffs failed to provide evidence that the cost of the litigation outweighed its potential financial benefits to them. View "Millview County Water District v. State Water Resources Control Board" on Justia Law

For some period of time before March 2015, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board had delegated plenary authority to seek injunctive relief under Labor Code section 1160.4 to general counsel. In March 2015, the board decided to change that delegation by requiring general counsel to obtain case-specific approval from the board for every request for injunctive relief. In May 2015, general counsel asked the board to approve a proceeding for injunctive relief against Gerawan Farming, Inc. (Gerawan). The board gave its conditional approval to that proceeding. When Gerawan asked the board to disclose the communications between the board and general counsel regarding the matter under the California Public Records Act, the board refused, claiming privilege. Gerawan brought a writ proceeding in Sacramento County Superior Court seeking to force the board to disclose the requested communications, and the court ordered disclosure. The board brought the present writ proceeding to the Court of Appeals to challenge the superior court’s ruling. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the superior court erred in ordering disclosure of the communications between the board and general counsel relating to the decision to seek injunctive relief against Gerawan because those communications were indeed protected by the attorney-client privilege. "[E]ven if due process concerns with respect to the pending administrative proceeding against Gerawan are raised by the communications at issue, those concerns do not preclude the attorney-client privilege from attaching to those communications, and because the communications are privileged, they are exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act." Accordingly, the Court directed that a writ of mandate issue ordering the superior court to vacate its order requiring disclosure of those communications and enter a new order denying Gerawan’s request for disclosure. View "Agricultural Labor etc. Bd. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Defendants Eric Schrier, Frank Frederick, and Angela Martinez had been employed in various capacities by plaintiff SG Homecare, Inc. before abruptly leaving to start a competing firm, defendant Verio Healthcare, Inc. SG Homecare filed the underlying complaint, alleging the individual defendants breached their contractual and fiduciary duties, and misappropriated trade secrets. Schrier and his wife cross-complained against SG Homecare and its owner, Thomas Randall Rowley (together, the “SG parties”), alleging wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant Verio Healthcare and the individual defendants were represented by Donald Wagner of the firm Buchalter Nemer, PLC. Shortly after the cross-complaint was filed, the SG Parties moved to disqualify Buchalter Nemer. The motion was based on an assertion that shortly before the individual defendants’ departure from SG Homecare, Buchalter Nemer executed a retainer agreement with SG Homecare and was either currently representing SG Homecare, or, alternatively, the present litigation was substantially related to Buchalter Nemer’s prior representation of SG Homecare (requiring disqualification in either event). Adding to mix: Wagner, as a member of the California State Assembly, relied on statutory entitlement to a continuance and extension of time of the entire litigation. The trial court denied the motion for a stay without explanation. Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals court for a writ of mandate to order the trial court to grant the stay. The Appeals court summarily denied the petition, but the California Supreme Court granted review and remanded back to the Appeals court with instructions to issue an order to show cause. The Court of Appeals issued that order and denied the writ, namely because it found that the trial court acted within its discretion in its finding that the stay would "defeat or abridge the other party's" right to relief. View "Verio Healthcare v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

GoTek, the client, appealed the judgment in a legal malpractice action entered in favor of SoCal (firm one), as well as the postjudgment order awarding firm one attorney fees. Firm one was client's patent counsel. After firm one failed to timely file patent applications, client retained Parker Mills (firm two) to bring a malpractice action against firm one. The trial court ruled that firm two had not filed the action within the one-year statute of limitations. The court affirmed, concluding that the record does not show why firm two waited until what it believed was the “eleventh hour” to file the malpractice action. As a matter of law, the tolling of the statute of limitations ended no later than November 8, 2012, more than one year before the filing of the malpractice action. Therefore, the court agreed with the trial court that firm two waited too long to file the action. View "Gotek Energy, Inc., v. SoCal IP Law Grp." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Hjelms leased an apartment in a large San Mateo complex from Prometheus. They signed the 24-page lease while still living in another state and without any negotiation. The lease had three one-sided provisions allowing Prometheus to recover attorney fees. Their apartment became infested with bedbugs, and the complex had an ongoing raw sewage problem. Ultimately the Hjelms and their children were forced to leave. The Hjelms sued Prometheus; a jury returned a verdict for them, awarding economic damage to the Hjelms in the amount of $11,652; non-economic damage to Christine Hjelm of $35,000; and non-economic damage to Justin Hjelm of $25,000. The trial court then awarded the Hjelms their attorney fees ($326, 475) based on Civil Code section 1717. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that a one-sided attorney’s fee provision violates Civil Code 1717(a). No challenge to the verdict could succeed and section 1717 does apply. View "Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

Currency loaned money at high interest rates to elderly artists who owned rights to receive royalty payments from music rights management companies. Wertheim persuaded artists to assign their royalty rights and any causes of action they might have against Currency. After Wertheim’s judgment against Currency had been vacated, the superior court in the interpleader proceedings released all deposited funds to Currency. Currency then moved to recoup from Wertheim the $238,615.45 in attorney fees that had been paid to the royalty payors, contending all or most of those entities’ fees were incurred as a result of Wertheim’s litigation tactics. In opposition to the motion, Wertheim contended the fees were incurred as a result of Currency’s litigation tactics. The superior court found no merit to either side's argument. Currency appeals the order denying its motion for attorney fees. The court concluded that equity does not require that Wertheim pay at least some of the fees where Wertheim had a colorable claim on the interpleaded funds in the form of a judgment, and Currency could have avoided the interpleader action by paying the judgment. Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding it “proper” for Currency to pay the attorney fees and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Wertheim LLC v. Omidvar" on Justia Law

Riding in a non-competitive charity bicycling event, Minick fell while descending a hill in Petaluma. Erwin, riding behind Minick, saw him lose control of his bicycle after hitting a large pothole. Minick exhausted his administrative remedies, and then, represented by Watson, brought suit under Government Code section 835. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that Minick, who had no recollection of the accident, had no proof of any dangerous condition on public property. Watson opposed the motion, attaching grainy, low-resolution black-and-white photographs of the alleged site, a copy of a police report containing Erwin's statement that he saw a pothole where Minick fell; and an engineer's expert declaration that a defect in the street caused the fall. The court issued a tentative ruling denying the motion. At the hearing, Watson appeared, but showed signs of physical distress and was taken to a hospital by ambulance. The day before a continued hearing, the court again tentatively denied the motion. After hearing arguments, the court granted the motion, referring to Watson’s arguments as “ludicrous.” The court later granted relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b), accepting Watson’s explanation that he had been suffering from a serious illness for which he was under heavy medication. The court of appeal affirmed., When a court finds a wholesale disintegration of the attorney’s professional capacity because of a medical crisis, the availability of relief for excusable neglect is within the court’s sound discretion. View "Minick v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Tracy and Jose married in 1996. They later separated. Tracy filed a petition for dissolution in 2011. In 2012, the superior court ordered temporary spousal support. The parties decided not to further litigate the case in the superior court and stipulated to the appointment of attorney Perkovich as judge pro tempore, under California Rules of Court 2.830-2.834. After Perkovich had served for two years, Tracy learned that Perkovich had not disclosed “in writing or on the record” professional relationships she had with lawyers in the proceeding, as required by the Rules. Tracy filed in the superior court a statement seeking disqualification. Perkovich failed to respond in accordance with statutory procedure. The presiding judge ordered her disqualified, holding that she was deemed to have consented to disqualification by her failure to file a consent or verified answer. The case was reassigned; discovery proceeded. The court delayed a hearing on Tracy’s motion to set aside orders made by Perkovich. The court of appeal held that Perkovich’s failure to contest the claims means that those factual allegations must be taken as true and that she was automatically disqualified. Her rulings are all void; the settlement agreement signed before her disqualification was tainted and may not be enforced. Perkovich’s conduct did not taint the proceedings before the superior court judge who replaced her. View "Hayward v. Super Court" on Justia Law

The Permanent Quarry, a 3,510-acre surface mining operation producing limestone and aggregate for the manufacture of cement, is located in unincorporated Santa Clara County. The Quarry, owned by Lehigh, has been in existence since 1903. In 2011 the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors enacted a resolution finding that the Quarry’s surface mining operations are a legal nonconforming use. A non-profit organization, No Toxic Air, sought a peremptory writ of mandate challenging the resolution. The trial court upheld the County’s resolution. The court granted No Toxic Air’s motion to strike the attorney and paralegal expenses Lehigh incurred to prepare the administrative record for the writ of mandate proceedings. Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5(a) provides, “[i]f the expense of preparing all of any part of the record has been borne by the prevailing party, the expense shall be taxable as costs.” The court of appeal reversed, holding that labor costs for attorneys and paralegals to prepare the administrative record are recoverable as expenses under that section. View "No Toxic Air, Inc. v. Lehigh SW Cement Co." on Justia Law

JAMS, Inc. provided private alternative dispute resolution services by promoting, arranging and handling the hiring of neutral individuals, such as retired judges, to assist with resolution of disputes. This action arose out of representations made on the JAMS Web site regarding the background of the Honorable Sheila Prell Sonenshine (Retired), and JAMS's operations in offering alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services. Kevin Kinsella alleged he relied upon certain representations made on the Web site when he agreed to stipulate to hire Sonenshine as a privately compensated judge to resolve issues related to his marital dissolution case and later discovered the representations were either untrue or misleading. JAMS and Sonenshine filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike Kinsella's complaint. The court found the action exempt from the anti-SLAPP procedure under the commercial speech exemption of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.17, subdivision (c). JAMS and Sonenshine filed a petition for writ of mandate or other relief. The Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings and issued an order to show cause why relief should not be granted to allow the Court an opportunity to consider the issues raised in the petition related to the scope of the commercial speech exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c). After consideration of the matter, the Court of Appeal agreed the commercial speech exemption applied and precluded the use of the anti-SLAPP procedure in this case. The petition was accordingly denied. View "JAMS, Inc. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law