Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This case arose when partners of the law firm Thelen LLP, a registered limited liability partnership governed by California law, voted to dissolve the firm. At issue was whether, for purposes of administering the firm's related bankruptcy, New York law treats a dissolved law firm's pending hourly fee matters as its property. The court certified controlling questions of law to the New York Court of Appeals, concluding that the court could not definitely answer the issue without the guidance of the state court. View "In Re: Thelen LLP" on Justia Law

The Millers retained Ettinger in 2008 to represent them in a landlord/tenant dispute. Over 23 months, Ettinger billed $43,000. The dispute settled for $9,500. The Millers paid Ettinger $20,000, but even before the landlord-tenant matter settled, Ettinger sought relief in Pennsylvania state court to accelerate the speed at which he was paid. He petitioned to withdraw as a counsel, first based on alleged failure to pay and then due to professed “lack of cooperation.” Both petitions were rejected, though the Millers were ordered to make “good faith” payments. Despite their continued payments, Ettinger sued the Millers, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection the following month. Ettinger filed an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court to prevent discharge of the Millers’ remaining debt to him, alleging fraud. The Bankruptcy Court rejected the complaint and imposed a $20,000 sanction against Ettinger jointly with his attorney. The district court vacated on the ground that the sanctions violated the “safe harbor” requirements of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011, which requires 21 days between serving and filing a sanctions motion, during which period the challenged conduct may be remedied, but refused to remand for further consideration. The Third Circuit remanded with instructions to permit the Bankruptcy Court to consider alternative avenues to impose sanctions. View "In re: Miller" on Justia Law

After the mutual funds, known as the Lancelot or Colossus group, folded in 2008, the trustee in bankruptcy filed independent suits or adversary actions seeking to recover from solvent third parties, including the Funds’ auditor, law firm, and some of the Funds’ investors, which the Trustee believes received preferential transfers or fraudulent conveyances. The Funds had invested in notes issued by Thousand Lakes, which was actually a Ponzi scheme, paying old investors with newly raised money. In these proceedings the trustee contends that investors who redeemed shares before the bankruptcy received preferential transfers, 11 U.S.C. 547, or fraudulent conveyances, 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B) and raised a claim under the Illinois fraudulent-conveyance statute, using the avoiding power of 11 U.S.C. 544. The bankruptcy court dismissed the claims against the law firm that prepared circulars for the Firms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No Illinois court has held that failure to report a corporate manager’s acts to the board of directors exposes a law firm to malpractice liability. The complaint does not plausibly allege that alerting the directors would have made a difference. View "Peterson v. Winston & Strawn, LLP" on Justia Law

The bankruptcy court held that appellants violated 11 U.S.C. 527 and 528(a)(1), Florida Rules of Professional Conduct 4-3.3(a)(1), and 4-8.4(c), and possibly 18 U.S.C. 157(3) by helping appellee file an "ostensibly pro se [Voluntary Chapter 13] bankruptcy petition in bad faith to stall a foreclosure sale." The bankruptcy court held that appellants prepared the Chapter 13 petition as ghostwriters and consequently made false and fraudulent representations to the court. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in its determination that appellants committed fraud when they contracted with appellee to provide foreclosure defense services, took appellee's money, had appellee sign documents, and then filed an ostensibly "pro se," bad faith bankruptcy petition on appellee's behalf. At bottom, the court concluded that appellants did not "draft" a document within the scope of Rule 4-1.2(c) and did not commit fraud in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct or 18 U.S.C. 157(3). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Torrens, et al. v. Hood, Jr." on Justia Law

Stern represented Allen in a discrimination suit, after which they became romantically involved. Allen and her husband had separated and had executed a settlement agreement awarding Allen $95,000, to be paid in installments. A month later, Allen visited a bankruptcy attorney, Losey, giving Stern’s name as “friend/referral” on an intake form. In filing for bankruptcy, Allen did not disclose the marital settlement. While her bankruptcy was pending, Allen received the money. A month after her bankruptcy discharge, Allen transferred the settlement proceeds to Stern, who opened a CD in his name. The attorney for Allen’s ex-husband informed the bankruptcy trustee that Allen failed to disclose the settlementand the discharge was revoked. Allen pleaded guilty to making a false declaration in a bankruptcy proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 152(3). She told a grand jury that Stern had not referred her to Losey and was convicted of making a material false statement in a grand jury proceeding, 18 U.S.C. 1623. The court admitted Losey’s client-intake form as evidence of perjury. Stern was convicted of conspiring to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956(h). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Allen’s conviction, holding that the intake form was not a communication in furtherance of legal representation and was not subject to attorney-client privilege. Reversing Stern’s conviction, the court held that the judge erred in excluding Stern’s testimony about why he purchased the CDs. View "United States v. Stern" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions on her for making factually unsupported and harassing statements in documents filed with the court. The court concluded that Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 did not authorize the sanctions imposed in this case; even if Rule 9011 was inapplicable, it did not mean that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to sanction plaintiff; the court had jurisdiction over the appeal where the penalty imposed was criminal in nature because the monetary penalty was punitive, payable to the court, and non-compensatory; plaintiff did not move for recusal or object to the judge's participation and she therefore forfeited any objection; the bankruptcy court did not commit an obvious error by failing to recuse sua sponte and there was no showing of prejudice or miscarriage of justice; there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome before a different judge where the evidence of plaintiff's contempt was undisputed and aggravated; and plaintiff's remaining claims about the contempt process were without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Isaacson v. Manty" on Justia Law

Spehar, hired by CMGT to assist in finding financing for its business, sued CMGT over a dispute related to this agreement and obtained a $17 million default judgment against CMGT, which had no assets. Spehar Capital devised a plan to: force CMGT into bankruptcy; convince the bankruptcy trustee to bring a malpractice action against CMGT’s law firm on the theory that but for the firm’s negligence, Spehar would not have obtained the default judgment; win the malpractice action or force a settlement; obtain a share of the payment to the bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy trustee sued CMGT’s law firm, Mayer Brown. The district court granted Mayer Brown summary judgment, reasoning that the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred the inconsistencies in the suit, based on undisputed facts. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. If the trustee were to prevail, there would be a clear impression that a court was misled. It would be “absurd” for Spehar to recover when proving the causation element of malpractice would require the trustee to prove that Spehar was not entitled to prevail in the earlier suit. View "Grochocinski v. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, LLP" on Justia Law

Defendant, a lawyer, deposited lucre in his law firm's bank accounts after he was convicted of criminal activity, where it was commingled with the firm's receipts from legitimate clients. At issue was whether the money in the bank accounts at the time defendant was charged was subject to forfeiture. The sheer volume of financial information available and required to separate tainted from untainted monies in this case lead the court to apply the Third Circuit's rule in United States v. Voigt; in this case, the district court erred in ordering forfeiture of the funds as proceeds; consequently, all proceedings the court held subsequent to the imposition of defendant's sentence must be vacated; the court's conclusion did not foreclose the Government's attempt to forfeit a property interest held by defendant individually; and, after addressing the parties' remaining arguments, the court reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Rothstein" on Justia Law

The Trustee for McKenzie’s bankruptcy estate filed an adversary proceeding against GKH, McKenzie’s law firm (and a creditor), seeking records pertaining to entities in which McKenzie allegedly had an interest (11 U.S.C. 542). The parties entered into an agreed order. The Trustee then filed other actions, arising from the same post-petition transfer of 50 acres from the Cleveland Auto Mall, an entity in which McKenzie had a 50% interest, to a newly formed entity in which McKenzie had no interest. The Trustee alleged violation of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. 362(k) and preferential or fraudulent transfer, 11 U.S.C. 547(b) and 544(g)). The Bankruptcy Court dismissed, finding that under Tennessee law and notwithstanding prior dissolution, CAM existed as a separate legal entity such that the land remained its separate property. The Trustee then filed a state court action, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and civil conspiracy to commit fraud; GKH allegedly represented McKenzie under a conflict of interest in drafting the transfer documents. Several claims were dismissed as untimely. GKH then sued the Trustee alleging malicious prosecution and abuse of process. The Bankruptcy Court dismissed GKH’s adversary proceeding alleging claims, citing quasi-judicial immunity and failure to state a claim, and denied GKH’s motion for leave to file a complaint in state court. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "In re McKenzie" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from the district court's appointment of a receiver of Jeffrey Baron's personal property and entities he owned or controlled. Barron and Munish Krishan formed a joint venture involving the ownership and sale of internet domain names. Disputes arose between the venturers, resulting in at least seven lawsuits. The district court subsequently sought to stop Baron's practice of regularly firing one lawyer and hiring a new one. Baron appealed the receivership order and almost every order entered by the district court thereafter. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the appointment of the receiver was an abuse of discretion. Numerous motions and a writ of mandamus to overturn the bankruptcy court's striking of notices of appeal to the district court were also before the court. Most were denied as moot and the court addressed the remaining motions that were relevant. View "Netsphere Inc., et al v. Baron" on Justia Law