Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs in this case alleged their former bankruptcy trustee breached professional duties due them because of conflicting obligations the trustee owed the bankruptcy estate. Plaintiffs sought recovery under state law. However, plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the trustee alleging diversity jurisdiction and the right to have the case resolved in an Article III court. The trustee maintained the case should have been heard in an Article I bankruptcy court because the alleged-breached professional duties arose from the bankruptcy proceedings. The district court concluded the case should have been heard in the Article I court, and certified its decision for immediate appeal. The Tenth Circuit concluded that an Article III court had jurisdiction, and reversed the district court's order. View "Loveridge v. Hall" on Justia Law

The Bankruptcy Code provides preferential treatment to domestic support obligations. Young filed for bankruptcy shortly after he and his wife, Stephens, divorced. The divorce decree required Young to pay alimony. Young did not pay. Stephens filed contempt proceedings in state court and Young was jailed. Young responded by filing an adversary proceeding against Stephens in the bankruptcy court, alleging a violation of the stay. In the bankruptcy, including the adversary proceeding, attorney Cruz represented Young. She repeatedly mischaracterized past-due post-petition alimony obligations as past-due prepetition obligations and falsely asserted Young was current on his alimony payments, representing that Young would "continue" to make alimony payments. In reliance on these representations, the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan. After discovering Cruz's false statements, the court entered a show-cause order and concluded that Cruz had no basis in law or fact for her assertions. Citing Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011, the court imposed, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Eighth Circuit affirmed, sanctions; suspending Cruz from practice in the Arkansas bankruptcy courts for six months, fining her $1,000, and directing her to attend CLE. Rule 9011 required Cruz to "make a reasonable inquiry into whether . . . a factual and legal basis" supported her assertions. View "In re: Cruz" on Justia Law

ASARCO hired the law firms to assist it in carrying out its duties as a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, 11 U.S.C. 327(a). When ASARCO emerged from bankruptcy, the law firms filed fee applications requesting fees under section 330(a)(1), which permits bankruptcy courts to “award . . . reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by” professionals. The Bankruptcy Court rejected ASARCO’s objections and awarded fees for time spent defending the applications. The district court held that the firms could be awarded fees for defending their fee applications. The Fifth Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed. Section330(a)(1) does not permit bankruptcy courts to award fees to section 327(a) professionals for defending fee applications. The American Rule provides the basic point of reference for attorney’s fees: Each litigant pays his own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. Congress did not depart from the American Rule in section 330(a)(1) for fee-defense litigation. The phrase “reasonable compensation for services rendered” necessarily implies “loyal and disinterested service in the interest of” a client, Time spent litigating a fee application against the bankruptcy estate’s administrator cannot be fairly described as “labor performed for”—let alone “disinterested service to”—that administrator. Requiring bankruptcy attorneys to bear the costs of their fee-defense litigation under section 330(a)(1) creates no disincentive to bankruptcy practice. View "Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC" on Justia Law

HSBC initiated a Wisconsin foreclosure action on the Rinaldi’s mortgage. The Rinaldis counterclaimed, alleging that the mortgage paperwork had been fraudulently altered and that HSBC lacked standing to enforce the mortgage. The Rinaldis lost at summary judgment and did not appeal. The court later vacated its foreclosure judgment after HSBC agreed to modify the loan. The Rinaldis filed a new state lawsuit reasserting their counterclaims. Before the court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Rinaldis filed for bankruptcy. In those proceedings, HSBC filed a proof of claim for the mortgage. The Rinaldis objected and filed adversary claims, alleging fraud, abuse of process, tortious interference, breach of contract, and violations of RICO and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The bankruptcy court found in favor of HSBC and recommended denial of the adversarial claims. The district court agreed, noting the Rinaldis’ failure to comply with Federal Rules. The court dismissed the Rinaldis’ adversary claims as meritless and warned that the Rinaldis would face sanctions if they filed additional frivolous filings because their tactics had “vexatious and time- and resource-consuming” and their filings “nigh-unintelligible.” After additional filings of the same type, the Rinaldis voluntarily dismissed their bankruptcy. Their attorney filed additional frivolous motions. The court ordered the attorney to pay $1,000. The Seventh Circuit upheld the sanction. View "Nora v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

Appellant and her law firm appealed the bankruptcy court's contempt order holding them in civil contempt for failing to pay sanctions imposed for prior misconduct. The misconduct stemmed from appellant's misconduct in her legal representation of debtor during bankruptcy proceedings. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to enforce the sanctions orders through any appropriate means, including a civil contempt order; the court rejected appellant's contention that she was "threatened" with imprisonment and concluded that the order does not violate the prohibition on imprisonment for a debt; and the order was not an abuse of the bankruptcy court's discretion because appellant is not protected by her alleged membership in her LLC where she was found in civil contempt for failure to pay sanctions that she owed because of her own misconduct in prior bankruptcy proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "Garrett v. Coventry II DDR" on Justia Law

Claimants filed a $2,142,000 non-priority unsecured proof of claim in jointly administered Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. That claim was disallowed by the bankruptcy court; the district court and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. As a result of the multitude of filings, strategies employed and positions taken over a six year period, the bankruptcy court sanctioned the attorney, Grossman, the sum of $207,004 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the court’s inherent authority under 11 U.S.C. 105, representing the attorney fees expended by counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors and, post-confirmation, the Liquidation Trustee and his counsel, directly or indirectly related to the claim litigation. Grossman appealed the sanction and an order denying a motion which sought the recusal of the bankruptcy judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455. In a separate appeal, Grossman challenged the retention of special counsel to collect the judgment against him and an order requiring him to submit to a debtor’s examination and provide written discovery. Consolidating the appeals, the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. Grossman vexatiously pursued arguments and filed documents throughout the litigation that were frivolous; his claims about the judge were misstatements. View "In re: Royal Manor Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

Stephens, an attorney, is controlling principal of Southwest Medical, the Debtor, and has an interest in Southeast, the debtor in a separate bankruptcy. The Chapter 7 Trustee filed an adversary proceeding against Southeast and Stephens based on assets that were transferred post-petition by the Debtor to Southeast, and sought imposition of a constructive trust. By joint stipulation, Stephens was dismissed from the Adversary Proceeding. In 2013, following a trial, the Bankruptcy Court denied Stephens’ Motion to Intervene in the Adversary Proceeding; entered an order that allowed the Trustee an unsecured claim against Southeast ($1,190,000); and denied a constructive trust against Southeast’s assets. While Stephens’ appeal was pending, and on the last day of the one-year limitation period under FRCP 60(b), Stephens moved for Relief from Judgment or Order, alleging that the Trustee’s attorney had colluded with Southeast’s attorneys, amounting to a “fraud on the court.” The court denied Stephens’ Rule 60 Motion because, he was not a party in the Adversary Proceeding; held that Stephens’ allegations of fraud on the court violated Rule 9011(b)(2) and (b)(3); and ordered Stephens to pay $19,188.42 in attorney fees plus $1,659.10 as a sanction under Rule 9011(c)(2). The Eighth Circuit affirmed. View "Williams v. Stephens" on Justia Law

Prosser filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 2006, which was converted to a Chapter 7 petition. Carroll was appointed as trustee. At a 2008 trial to adjudicate creditors’ objections to Prosser’s claim of exemptions, Stelzer, Prosser’s former “valet and personal assistant,” testified that Prosser asked him to destroy computer hard drives after Prosser filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court denied the exemptions. Carroll and others initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. 727(a), Prosser deposed Stelzer in an effort to undermine his testimony; Prosser Counsel inquired into the payment of Stelzer’s legal fees by third parties and contacts Stelzer had with Carroll and Carroll’s counsel. Prosser Counsel later sought an evidentiary hearing into “a bribery scheme,” asserting that Stelzer gave unfavorable testimony during the Exemptions Trial in exchange for payment of his attorney fees in multiple litigations and that Carroll’s counsel had misrepresented Carroll’s contacts with Stelzer. Ultimately, Carroll obtained an award of legal fees and expenses against Prosser Counsel (28 U.S.C. 1927) contending that the Adversary Complaint, the Fee Objections, and the Conflicts Motion were patently meritless. The district court vacated, holding that the Adversary Complaint and Fee Objections could not have “multiplied” the adversary proceedings. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the sanctions. View "In re: Prosser" on Justia Law

Noel Bisges represented debtor in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. United States Trustee Nancy Gargula moved to reopen the case after it was closed because she learned that debtor possibly failed to disclose in her bankruptcy petition that she owns horses. On appeal, Bisges challenged the district court's decision upholding the bankruptcy court's denial of Bisges's motion to dismiss and the imposition of sanctions against him. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where there is insufficient evidence of bad faith by Gargula. Further, the court saw no clear error in the bankruptcy judge's findings that Bisges advised debtor to omit from her bankruptcy petition a payment to her mother and Bisges violated 11 U.S.C. 707(b)(4)(C) by attaching to the bankruptcy petition schedules that significantly differed from the schedules that debtor had signed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bisges v. Gargula" on Justia Law

Bradley Ian Berger and his law firm filed suit against debtor and his law partner in state court for outstanding fees owed to plaintiffs under a referral agreement between the parties. Berger had difficulty proving the amount of fees owed because debtor's partnership failed to file certain documents with the State. The failure led to discovery sanctions and the parties eventually settled. Berger subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against debtor in the bankruptcy court, arguing that 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(3) prevented debtor from obtaining bankruptcy relief. The court concluded that Berger failed to show that the facts of this case fell within the scope of section 727(a)(3) and the court rejected Berger's contention that the court's ruling permits debtor to evade his "legal and ethical duties" where debtor had already been sanctioned by the state court for failure to keep legally required documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of debtor's motion for summary judgment.View "Berger & Assocs. Attorneys, P.C. v. Kran" on Justia Law