Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

Three commissioners of the Port of Benton—Scott Keller, William O’Neil, and Lori Stevens—were the subject of recall petitions filed by Benton County voters. The petitions alleged thirteen counts of misconduct for each commissioner, largely focusing on actions attributed to Keller, some of which occurred before he was elected commissioner. The essential allegations that occurred during their terms as commissioners were that the three retaliated against the Port’s executive director, Diahann Howard, by suspending her after she raised complaints leading to an investigation of Keller, and that they retaliated against the Port’s finance director, Alicia Myers, by terminating her after she released the investigation report. Additionally, Keller alone was accused of failing to disclose his ownership interest in an LLC with a lease from the Port, as required by state law.A Benton County Superior Court judge reviewed the recall petitions, dismissing most of the thirteen charges against each commissioner as legally or factually insufficient. However, the court found two charges—retaliation against Howard and Myers—factually and legally sufficient against all three commissioners, and found the failure to disclose financial information charge factually and legally sufficient against Keller alone. The recall proponents did not appeal the dismissal of other charges, and the commissioners appealed the sufficiency findings to the Washington Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington affirmed the trial court’s rulings in all respects. The court held that the charges of retaliation for whistleblowing and failure to disclose material financial interests stated factually and legally sufficient grounds for recall under the Washington Constitution and statutes. Specifically, the court found that actual or threatened retaliation constitutes misfeasance, malfeasance, or a violation of the oath of office, and that intentional nondisclosure of required financial information by an elected official is legally sufficient to support recall. The court’s disposition allows these charges to proceed to the voters. View "In re Recall of O'Neil" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment for back pain at a hospital and subsequently left partially paralyzed. He retained an attorney on a contingency fee basis to pursue claims for medical malpractice. The agreement set attorney fees at varying percentages, depending on when the case was resolved. The attorney then brought in a second law firm as co-counsel under a similar agreement. During the course of litigation, the patient’s attorneys amended the complaint to add an ordinary negligence claim alongside the professional negligence claims. The case settled for a confidential amount. After settlement, the attorneys claimed that the ordinary negligence claim removed the settlement from Nevada’s statutory cap on attorney fees in medical professional negligence cases, and they sought to collect higher fees under their agreements. The client disputed this, asserting that the statutory cap should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County ruled in favor of the attorneys, finding that the ordinary negligence claim was not subject to the statutory cap on attorney fees and that the attorneys were entitled to the full contingency fee amounts. The court also found that the attorneys had properly perfected their attorney liens on the settlement proceeds, even though notice of the liens was sent after receipt of the first settlement check.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that, under the recent decision in Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, the substance of the patient’s ordinary negligence claim sounded in professional negligence, so the statutory cap on attorney fees applied. The Supreme Court further held that attorney liens must be perfected (by notice to the client) before the attorney receives settlement funds, so only the lien on the second settlement check was validly perfected. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "CASTILLO VS. ATKINSON WATKINS & HOFFMANN, LLP" on Justia Law

An employee of the Internal Revenue Service, who also served as trustee for her goddaughter’s trust, was terminated from her position following an investigation into her tax returns and health insurance claims. The investigation revealed that she had improperly claimed her goddaughter and goddaughter’s son as dependents for several tax years and placed them on her federal health insurance plan, despite not meeting eligibility criteria. The employee acknowledged to investigators that she knew her actions were technically illegal. Additional incidents involving misuse of her government travel card were also considered as prior discipline. The employee challenged the resulting tax liabilities in the U.S. Tax Court, ultimately settling for a reduced amount based on a stipulation between her and the IRS.An Administrative Judge of the Merit Systems Protection Board initially reversed her removal, finding in her favor. However, following a petition for review by the IRS, the full Merit Systems Protection Board reversed the judge’s decision, sustaining her removal. The Board concluded that the IRS had proven its primary reason for removal by a preponderance of the evidence, and merged another reason into it, without reaching a third reason. The Board gave evidentiary weight to the Tax Court settlement and associated documents, which had been discounted by the Administrative Judge.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed whether the Board’s consideration of the Tax Court settlement documents violated evidentiary principles, specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The court held that the Board did not abuse its discretion in considering those materials to establish the fact of the admitted liability, and that even if there had been an evidentiary error, the petitioner failed to show harm or prejudice. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s final decision sustaining the removal. View "HARRIS-CAMPBELL v. TREASURY " on Justia Law

Two high-ranking officers in a city police department—one the chief and the other the deputy chief of operations—were subject to an internal firearms proficiency assessment. Department policy mandated regular qualifications, and there was confusion over which of two overlapping policies governed discipline for failures. After the deputy chief failed the assessment, she received an extra attempt to qualify, which she passed, and the chief subsequently allowed all failing officers a third attempt. A lieutenant, believing the chief had abused his authority to benefit the deputy chief, filed a complaint with the state ethics commission, prompting an investigation by commission officials.During the investigation, the commission’s special agent and general counsel relied on the allegedly superseded policy, policy 2.311, to argue that the deputy chief faced possible financial penalties and thus had a financial interest in the outcome. There was confusion among department officials and investigators regarding which policy was in effect, and both policies were referenced in departmental communications and disciplinary records. The commission found probable cause of ethics violations by both officers and referred the matter to the state attorney general. However, the attorney general found that the commission officials had relied on false evidence and misrepresentations. An internal review by the commission cleared its officials of wrongdoing.The officers sued the commission’s executive director, special agent, and general counsel in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process violations based on fabricated evidence, among other claims. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity, finding no substantial evidence that they fabricated evidence or acted in bad faith. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. View "Finley v. Albritton" on Justia Law

Highland Capital Management, L.P. and HCRE Partners (now NexPoint Real Estate Partners) collaborated on a large real estate project in 2018, forming SE Multifamily Holdings, LLC to acquire substantial residential assets. HCRE, controlled by James Dondero, and Highland structured their membership interests in the LLC through an amended agreement after another investor joined. When Highland later entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, HCRE, led by Dondero, filed a proof of claim asserting entitlement to distributions and seeking contract reformation regarding membership allocation. Both Dondero and another officer, Matt McGraner, admitted during litigation that their claim lacked merit, and evidence showed the claim was filed without investigation, likely to protect SE Multifamily’s assets from Highland’s creditors.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas oversaw the proceedings, including extensive discovery and a motion to disqualify HCRE’s counsel, which the court granted. As discovery continued, HCRE sought to withdraw its claim two days before critical depositions, but the bankruptcy court denied the motion, finding withdrawal would prejudice Highland. After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court ruled against HCRE, rejecting its contract reformation theory and disallowing its proof of claim. Subsequently, the court imposed sanctions on HCRE, finding bad faith in both the filing and litigation of the claim. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas affirmed the imposition of sanctions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ decisions. The Fifth Circuit held that clear and convincing evidence supported the bankruptcy court’s finding that HCRE acted in bad faith by filing a baseless claim and litigating it in bad faith, including frivolously opposing the disqualification of counsel and seeking to withdraw the claim to avoid discovery while preserving it for future litigation. The court also held the sanctions were causally related to HCRE’s conduct and not an abuse of discretion. View "NexPoint v. Highland" on Justia Law

The case centers on an incident where Joann Wright Haysbert, an academic administrator, slipped and fell while picking up an order at an Outback Steakhouse in Chesapeake, Virginia. She claimed to have suffered a traumatic brain injury and related cognitive impairments as a result of the fall, and brought a negligence lawsuit against Outback and its parent company. The litigation was marked by contentious proceedings, particularly involving her son, Attorney Nazareth Haysbert, who represented her pro hac vice.After Outback removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the first trial was declared a mistrial due to Attorney Haysbert’s repeated unprofessional conduct, including outbursts before the jury and violations of court instructions. Subsequently, his pro hac vice admission was revoked. The district court granted Dr. Haysbert's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, but imposed strict limitations on discovery for any potential refiling. When Dr. Haysbert refiled the case, further disputes arose, including the late disclosure of a new expert report and challenges during jury selection.Upon retrial, the district court excluded Dr. Haysbert’s expert witness, Dr. Filler, as a sanction for untimely disclosure of his report, and denied her Batson challenge to Outback’s use of peremptory strikes against Black potential jurors. The jury found for Outback.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Haysbert lacked standing to challenge the revocation of her attorney’s pro hac vice admission based on his due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding Dr. Filler’s testimony as a sanction or in denying the Batson challenge, concluding that the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The judgment in favor of Outback was affirmed. View "Haysbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC" on Justia Law

A citizen filed an ethics complaint against a legislator, alleging violations of the Alaska Legislative Ethics Act due to the legislator’s blocking of a constituent and deletion of comments from her social media page. The Alaska Legislature Select Committee on Legislative Ethics investigated and found probable cause that the legislator had violated statutory provisions requiring integrity in legislative conduct and unencumbered access for constituents. The Committee recommended the legislator refrain from blocking comments solely for disagreement but imposed no sanctions, determining further proceedings were unnecessary after the legislator deactivated her social media page.The legislator then filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, against both the Ethics Committee and the State, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. She alleged violations of due process and statutory procedures, requesting discovery and a public hearing. The superior court dismissed the claims against the Ethics Committee, holding that legislative immunity barred them and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Claims against the State were dismissed as no actionable conduct by the executive branch was alleged. The court also denied motions to amend the complaint, finding the new claims either futile or untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s judgment. The court held that the legislator’s claims against the Ethics Committee were barred by the doctrine of legislative immunity, which protects legislative bodies from litigation over the exercise of their official duties, including self-discipline and rulemaking. The court also agreed that the claims against the State were legally insufficient as no relief could be granted. Furthermore, it concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the legislator’s motions to amend the complaint due to futility and untimeliness. View "Reinbold v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a married couple, both dual citizens of the United States and Sudan, who were married in Sudan in 2001 and lived in multiple countries during their marriage. After relocating to Fargo, North Dakota, the relationship deteriorated, and the wife obtained a domestic violence protection order against the husband. The wife subsequently initiated divorce proceedings in North Dakota. The husband moved to dismiss the action, arguing that he had already obtained a divorce certificate in Sudan by pronouncing talaq and that the North Dakota district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to this prior foreign divorce.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, denied the husband's motion to dismiss, finding that it would not exercise comity to recognize the Sudanese divorce certificate due to lack of notice and due process for the wife. After trial, the court found evidence of domestic violence and coercive control, awarded the wife primary residential responsibility and sole decision-making authority regarding the children, and denied the husband parenting time. The court also distributed marital property under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, awarded the wife spousal support and attorney’s fees, and entered a divorce judgment.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, that the decision not to recognize the Sudanese divorce certificate was not an abuse of discretion, and that the rulings on property division, spousal support, and attorney’s fees were not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court also imposed a $1,000 sanction on the husband for improper legal citations and remanded to the district court for determination of whether an additional award of attorney’s fees and costs for the appeal would result in undue financial hardship to the husband. View "Ali v. Osman" on Justia Law

An attorney representing two appellants in a civil case filed appellate briefs containing numerous accusations of bias against the trial judge who had presided over the underlying matter. The attorney repeatedly asserted, without evidentiary support, that the trial court was prejudiced, had employed a “double standard,” and improperly favored the opposing party. These allegations were not substantiated by anything in the record, but were instead based solely on the attorney’s disagreement with adverse rulings and the outcome of the litigation. The attorney had previously sought to disqualify the trial judge, but those efforts were unsuccessful and ultimately denied by the California Supreme Court.After reviewing the appellate briefs, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, identified 26 unsupported accusations of judicial bias and issued an order to show cause, requiring the attorney to explain why contempt or sanctions should not be imposed. In response, the attorney acknowledged some rhetorical excesses but maintained that the accusations were reasonable inferences from the trial court’s rulings. At oral argument, the attorney expressed regret but ultimately admitted there was no evidence in the record to support the allegations of bias.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found the attorney in direct contempt for asserting in a brief heading that the trial court’s “Biased Trial Rulings Violated the Bespalov’s Due Process Rights,” and imposed a $1,000 fine. The court ordered the attorney and its clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the State Bar. The holding emphasizes that attorneys may not accuse a judge of bias without evidentiary support and that such conduct constitutes contempt and warrants sanctions. View "A Company Hungary KFT v. Bespalov" on Justia Law

A woman who was diagnosed with placenta previa during her pregnancy developed placenta accreta spectrum (PAS) during a cesarean section at a hospital, which led to a massive hemorrhage and an emergent hysterectomy. After extensive surgery, she was moved to the ICU for monitoring. The ICU physician and a medical staffing agency were responsible for her care there. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children sued the ICU doctor and the staffing agency, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding deviations from the standard of care by the ICU doctor.The Superior Court of Rockdale County presided over the trial. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only the ICU physician and the staffing agency. The jury found both defendants liable, awarding $10 million to the estate for pain and suffering and $32 million to the children for wrongful death. After trial, the defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, to amend the judgment to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The court denied both motions, concluding the cap had been waived and, in the alternative, that the statutory cap was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees under Georgia law after the defendants rejected a qualifying settlement offer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of the defendants’ expert testimony, nor did it err in its jury instructions, as any alleged error was affirmatively waived by the defendants. The Court also held, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Clark v. Leigh and Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally be applied to the jury’s verdict in this case. The award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was affirmed. Judgment affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law