Justia Legal Ethics Opinion Summaries

This appeal concerned a dispute over attorney's fees related to a settlement of numerous civil rights lawsuits against the City and others. The court held that several important principles bear on the district court's determination of a reasonable fee amount: (1) the court must compute the fee award using an hourly rate that is based on the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community;" (2) when a district court reduces either the number of hours or the lodestar by a certain percentage greater than 10%, it must provide a clear and concise explanation for why it chose the specific percentage to apply; and (3) it was not per se unreasonable for the prevailing party in a civil rights case to be awarded an amount of attorney's fees that exceeds the amount of money recovered by his or her client. In this instance, the court vacated and remanded because the district court did not apply these principles when determining the amount of plaintiffs' attorney's fee award. View "Gonzalez v. City of Maywood" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the parties' dispute over an arbitration award to plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed the district court's ruling on interest and attorney's fees, and Lloyd's cross-appealed requesting return of an alleged overpayment to plaintiff from a fund which held that the award in escrow pending the outcome of litigation. The court concluded that the decision of the arbitrators did not foreclose the district court from awarding interests on the remaining portions of the arbitration award; plaintiff was entitled to post-award, pre-judgment interest pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.130; to the extent the mandate must include instructions on pre-judgment interest to comply with Rule 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court reformed the mandate as such; plaintiff was entitled to collect post-judgment interest on his post-award, pre-judgment interest from the date of this opinion until the date Lloyd's pays the interest; plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 689A.410(5); and the district court did not impermissibly overpay plaintiff when it released the funds from the escrow account and included interest on the contract damages through the date of payment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded in part and affirmed in part. View "Lagstein v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

The FBI appealed the district court's order granting Shura Council's motion for sanctions under Rule 11(c). The FBI had already "corrected" the challenged pleadings and provided all the information it was obligated to provide to the district court before Shura Council filed its motion for sanctions. Shura Council moved for sanctions long after the district court had ruled on the adequacy of the government's eventual compliance, and a fortiori after it had ruled the FBI's original response had been inadequate and misleading. The motion for sanctions was made after "judicial rejection of the offending contention." Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the award of fees. View "Islamic Shura Council of So. Cal. v. FBI" on Justia Law

After the court reversed and remanded for an award of social security disability benefits to plaintiff, plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. 2412(d). The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the fees where the government's underlying action was not substantially justified in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion and remanded for an award of fees and costs. View "Meier v. Colvin" on Justia Law

The parties dispute whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), limited the amount that plaintiff, a prisoner who qualified as a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees, could recover from defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial. The court held that the fee cap in section (d)(2) did not apply to attorney's fees earned in conjunction with an appeal in which prison officials sought unsuccessfully to reverse a verdict obtained by the prisoner before the district court. The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees on appeal and referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner to determine the amount of such fees, as well as the amount of reimbursable costs. View "Woods v. Carey" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from disputes over the estate of the late Texas oil magnate and billionaire J. Howard Marshall. J. Howard died in 1995, leaving nearly all his assets to his son, Pierce, but excluding his wife, Anna Nicole Smith (Vickie), and his other son, Howard, from receiving any part of his fortune. Howard and his Wife eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and their case was assigned to Judge Bufford, who had previously presided over Vickie's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Judge Bufford published three separate opinions: (1) denying Pierce's motion for reassignment or recusal; (2) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his constitutional arguments; and (3) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his statutory arguments. Elaine, Pierce's widow, now appeals the district court's decision, contending that the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's orders. The court addressed the various issues on appeal related to the motion for recusal or reassignment, constitutional issues, and non-constitutional issues, and ultimately affirmed the district court's decision. View "In the Matter of: Marshall" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 federal habeas corpus petition based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Skilling v. United States, which narrowed the scope of the honest services fraud theory. Defendant,a former attorney and trustee of private trusts, pleaded guilty to honest services fraud. The government conceded that defendant was actually innocent of honest services fraud in light of Skilling, which confined the reach of the offense to cases of bribes and kickbacks. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of defendant's honest services fraud claim where no evidence suggested that defendant either engaged in bribery or received kickbacks. View "United States v. Avery" on Justia Law

Higher Taste sued the Park district under 42 U.S.C. 1983, requesting a declaration that Resolution 40-05 violated its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and an injunction barring the resolution's enforcement. The district court granted Higher Taste's motion for a preliminary injunction, expressly ruling that Higher Taste had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. The parties later executed a written settlement agreement. Higher Taste then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b), which permitted an award to the "prevailing party" in certain civil rights actions, including those brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court denied the motion. The court reversed and concluded that, because Higher Taste was a prevailing party within the meaning of section 1988, it should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. On remand, the district court should determine in the first instance whether such special circumstances exist. View "Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Robert Silverman and his law firm on behalf of a class of Filipino teachers recruited to work in several school districts in Louisiana. Plaintiffs alleged that Silverman aided and abetted a human trafficking scheme in violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589, 1590, 1592, 1594, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968; breached his fiduciary duties to members of the plaintiff class; and committed legal malpractice through his role in procuring H-1B non-immigrant visas for the teachers. Silverman brought this interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of his special motion to strike plaintiffs' second amended complaint on the ground that plaintiffs' state law claims violated California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, and invoked Noerr-Pennington immunity against all of plaintiffs' claims. The court joined its sister circuits and held that the denial of a motion for Noerr-Pennington immunity from liability was not an immediately appealable collateral order. The court further held that it did not have pendent jurisdiction over the Noerr-Pennington issue and did not reach the merits of this issue. View "Tanedo, et al v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch., et al" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiffs' complaint asserting state and federal causes of action against eight defendants. At issue on appeal was the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff Joseph Padgett. The court vacated the district court's award of costs and attorney's fees because the district court provided no explanation of how it calculated them. The court remanded to the district court for an explanation of how it used the lodestar method to reduce Padgett's fees and how it calculated Padgett's reduced costs. For the same reason, the district court erred in failing to explain why it denied costs to the prevailing defendants. While the district court had discretion to depart from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) in appropriate cases, the court could not review its unexplained order for abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Padgett, et al v. Loventhal, et al" on Justia Law